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In “Civil Disobedience”, Thoreau writes: 
 
I have paid no poll-tax for six years. I was put into a jail once, for one 
night; and as I stood, considering the walls of solid stone, two or three 
feet thick, the door of wood and iron, a foot thick, and the iron grating 
which strained the light, I could not help being struck with the 
foolishness of that institution which treated me as if I were mere flesh 
and blood and bones, to be locked up (Thoreau, 1983/1849, p. 402). 
 
Thoreau had refused to pay the Massachusetts tax on the grounds of his 
opposition to the Mexican War and to slavery – specifically to the Fugitive 
Slave Law. He was, to his displeasure, released after only one night because 
someone, his aunt, in fact, had quietly paid on his behalf. But his refusal to 
pay the tax, and willingness to face the prison sentence, has become an 
emblem of civil disobedience, and his essayof this name soon became highly 
influential. Following Thoreau’s death, the term began to circulate in tracts 
and sermons opposing slavery, while in the 20th
 In fact, Thoreau’s account of his night in jail is far from disturbing. He 
liked the décor – a simple room with white-washed walls and plain furniture, 
more congenial to Thoreau than the increasing affluence and opulence of the 
houses of the Concord townsfolk. And he found his cell-mate agreeable, an 
intelligent man, who perhaps had fallen asleep, drunk in a barn, and whose 
pipe had perhaps started the fire that caused the burning down of the barn 
for which he had been prosecuted. He goes so far as to say that such a 
prison-cell is “the only house in a slave State in which a free man can abide 
 century the principle it 
enshrined was adopted in Mahatma Gandhi’s notion of satyagraha, and 
subsequently in civil rights movements, most notably in the United States 
and in South Africa. 
with honor”: “Under a government which imprisons unjustly, the true place 
for a just man is also a prison” (p. 398). 
 How are we to weigh these words and actions? There is a note of irony 
here, of course – irony not because what Thoreau says is not true but 
because his response to these conditions is a reversal of their intended 
effect, while his political gesture reverses the opposition of prison and 
civilian life. This is just one of the numerous sites where Thoreau identifies 
the townsfolk as imprisoned in their lives, docile subjectsavant la lettre. 
Here, in the opening pages of Walden, we find Thoreau declaring his 
intentions: 
 
I would fain say something, not so much concerning the Chinese and 
Sandwich Islanders as you who read these pages, who are said to live 
in New England, something about your condition, especially your 
outward condition or circumstances in this world, in this town, what 
it is, whether it is necessary that it be as bad as it is, whether it 
cannot be improved as well as not. I have travelled a great deal in 
Concord; and everywhere, in shops, and offices, and fields, the 
inhabitants have appeared to me to be doing penance in remarkable 
ways (Thoreau, 1983/1954, p. 46). 
 
The weight of money worries, meanness, and envy lead to lives that are a 
slow dying. People begin digging their graves as soon as they are born. And 
so, he continues, 
 
I sometimes wonder that we can be so frivolous, I may almost say, as 
to attend to the gross but somewhat foreign form of servitude called 
Negro Slavery, there are so many keen and subtle masters that 
enslave both north and south. It is hard to have a southern overseer; 
it is worse to have a northern one; but worst of all when you are the 
slave-driver of yourself. Talk of a divinity in man! . . . The mass of men 
lead lives of quiet desperation (pp. 49-50). 
 
Thoreau sometimes provokes the reader by professing a lack of concern for 
slavery in the Caribbean, wilfully offending the sensibility of decent, right-
thinking people, and Emerson before him had expressed himself in similar 
ways. But the aversion that lying behind these seemingly outrageous 
remarks is to a politics of good causes, which might be little more than a 
further buttress to the hubris of bourgeois life. Thoreau is explicit as to how 
our duty might more reasonably be conceived: 
 
It is not a man’s duty, as a matter of course, to devote himself to the 
eradication of any, even the most enormous wrong; he may still 
properly have other concerns to engage him; but it is his duty, at 
least, to wash his hands of it, and, if he gives it no thought longer, not 
to give it practically his support (Thoreau, 1983/1849, p. 393). 
 
To pay the poll-tax would then be to fall short of washing his hands of his 
government’s involvement in the Mexican War and its complicity in the 
Fugitive Slave Law, and for this he is prepared to go to jail. 
 But I asked how we are to weigh this, aware of the fact that the range 
of examples Marianna Papastephanou has encouraged us to consider 
include those in which great suffering, terror, and even death are involved, 
most notably the death of Socrates at the inauguration of philosophy. 
Should we not entertain the thought that there is, by comparison, 
something disturbingly bourgeois about Thoreau’s little protest and his 
marking of this in the essay.Are these no more than relatively mild 
extensions of a protected, armchair preoccupation? I am reminded of a 
scene in Oliver Stone’s Platoon in which the young captain, Charlie Sheen, is 
speaking to a black soldier about how he has come to be in Vietnam, there 
in the awful heat, risking his life. How come he is here and not at home in 
college somewhere? The words of the Sheen character run something like 
this: “I saw my middle-class friends going off to college and avoiding the 
draft, while the kids from the poor neighbourhoods were being sent to 
fightthe war. And I thought this isn’t right. I wanted to go to join them.” 
“Hell, man,” the soldier replies, “you gotta be middle-class to think like 
that!” Of course, we can be too quick in this respect too, and this would be 
to disavow the immense influence of Thoreau’s actions – the night in jail, 
“Civil Disobedience”, and his writings elsewhere, most notably Walden itself. 
But I wanted at least to register a degree of hesitancy in taking this as an 
echo from the prison cell. The significance of Thoreau for present purposes 
lies in a slightly different place. This is one that will bring us closer to 
philosophy’s potential intervention in educating humanity, its offering of the 
“learning experiences of a positively meant disorientation, a disruption of a 
routinized, automatic course of thought,” to quote words that frame our 
present symposium. Certainly Thoreau undertakes his philosophizing as an 
experiment in living, and in this the question of voice becomes paramount. 
 Consider the following remark in “Civil Disobedience” on the subject of 
voting: 
 
All voting is a sort of gaming, like checkers or backgammon, with a 
slight moral tinge to it, a playing with right and wrong, with moral 
questions; and betting naturally accompanies it. The character of the 
voters is not staked. . . (pp. 391-392). 
 
A vote is originally (etymologically) a voice, an association that Thoreau 
seems to exploit when he writes: “Cast your whole vote, not a strip of paper 
merely, but your whole influence” (p. 398). So what then is character, and 
what voice? Thoreau is advocating civil disobedience, defining a “peaceable 
revolution”, but with the important rider “if any such is possible”, and with 
the following dark admonition: 
 
But even suppose blood should flow. Is there not a sort of blood shed 
when the conscience is wounded? Through this wound a man’s real 
manhood and immortality flow out, and he bleeds to an everlasting 
death. I see this blood flowing now (p. 399). 
 
Thoreau seems in part here to be anticipating the Civil War, but the imagery 
evokes something more pervasive of what he will see as our condition. Take 
the following remark, bracing or chilling, from Walden, about how we might 
face (up to) our condition, about what that condition might be: 
 
If you stand right fronting and face to face to a fact, you will see the 
sun glimmer on both its surfaces, as if it were a cimiter, and feel its 
sweet edge dividing you through the heart and marrow, and so you 
will happily conclude your mortal career (Thoreau, 1983/1954, p. 
142). 
 
The extremity of this image has connotations that reverberate through 
Thoreau’s text: in the symbolism of his hoeing of his bean-field, cutting and 
dividing the soil in order to inseminate it, and in the doubling of this as a 
trope for the semiotic movement of Thoreau’s pen across the blank page; in 
thoughts of circumcision, redoubled in the multiple examples of crisis – of 
the snake sloughing its skin, or of Thoreau’s own daily immersion in the 
lake (“It was a religious exercise”); perhaps in a sexual symbolism too. Butits 
greatest significance is to be taken more literally: that to recognise a fact, to 
find words for it, is inevitably to do a certain violence, as one sees or 
expresses this side and not that side, impossible to see or say all at the 
same time. This is our condition, which is as much as to say that this is the 
way we word (-dit-) our world together (con-). 
 Thoreau invites attention to his words in multiple ways. Let’s take an 
example. Following a string of questions that he wishes his experiment in 
living to pose to his neighbours, concerning especially the economy of their 
lives, he remarks: “I try my neighbours with such questions.” Now the 
sentence bears reading again. Thoreau is irritating his neighbours by 
insisting on these matters as he does - he is, we might say, a very trying 
person. But he is also putting them on trial. That it takes a second reading 
to see this shows the way that the book imparts an ethics of reading. Indeed 
the third chapter is called “Reading”, and Thoreau will phrase the experience 
of words that has just been illustrated in terms of the acquiring of the 
“father tongue” – “a reserved and select expression, too significant to be 
heard by the ear, which we must be born again in order to speak” (p. 46). 
We saw earlier that Thoreau is addressing readers who are “said to live in 
New England”, which might, depending upon where one places the stress, 
be a comment on the naming of this new world or a questioning of whether 
his readers are alive at all! The ambiguity is there in the written text; it is 
obscured when we say the words. 
 There is no doubt then that Thoreau wants us to dwell on such terms 
as “condition” and “constitution”, remembering of course the American 
Constitution, and he is reiterating or recuperating here the Socratic thought 
that our city is a city of words.Hence, he is retrieving words that are of 
foundational importance: 
 
We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, 
that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable 
Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of 
Happiness. — That to secure these rights, Governments are instituted 
among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the 
governed, — That whenever any Form of Government becomes 
destructive of these ends, it is the Right of the People to alter or to 
abolish it, and to institute new Government, laying its foundation on 
such principles and organizing its powers in such form, as to them 
shall seem most likely to effect their Safety and Happiness. (July 4 
1776, Unanimous Declaration of the thirteen united States of 
America). 
 
But as his civil disobedience indicates, this is a foundation that is not 
achieved once and for all. To echo Emerson, finding is founding, such that 
each act of speech contributes to our condition, our city of words, and this 
is a process crucial for the kind of independence that would merit the name. 
In Socrates’ refusal to escape his fate, in Thoreau’s refusal to pay tax, as in 
declarations of independence, we see such actions writ large. But it would 
be a mistake to conclude that our political responsibility must be confined 
to such terms. We are in a sense condemned to language, and to its violence 
in cutting and dividing our world, but our responsibility in this extends 
across everything we say and do. Here is Thoreau describing his 
preparations for building of his hut, but at the same time symbolically 
acknowledging our linguistic inheritance and the responsibility this casts us 
in: 
 
Near the end of March, 1845, I borrowed an axe and went down to the 
woods by Walden Pond, nearest to where I intended to build my 
house, and began to cut down some tall arrowy white pines, still in 
their youth, for timber. It is difficult to begin without borrowing, but 
perhaps it is the most generous course thus to permit your fellow-men 
to have an interest in your enterprise. The owner of the axe, as he 
released it, said that it was the apple of his eye; but I returned it 
sharper than I received it (Thoreau, 1983/1954, p. 83). 
 
We need to find in our words the points of crisis, whose sharpness is 
necessary for the building of the city. We must not just receive words and 
pass them down along the line. We mustturn words, returning them to our 
fellow human beings but also finely turning them as on a lathe. To echo the 
vocabulary of counting and accounting that runs through the text (showing 
what counts for me and how I account for myself), we must return them 
with interest. This is part of the economy of living we need. 
 Thoreau is sentenced to prison for his failure to pay taxes. But is our 
condition not generally one of being sentenced? Sentenced by the words we 
(are condemned to) use? Thoreau is convicted for not paying his tax. But are 
we not to act and speak from our convictions, and in these are not we also 
convicted? The complex interconnections here, which a careful reading of 
our language seems to expose to us, are perhaps further aspects of that 
deconstruction of the opposition of prison and freedom that was noted 
above. I expressed earlier my concerns that there remained something 
perhaps too bourgeois (“literary” is the word I might be inclined to use now) 
about attending to echoes from the prison cell in this way. But to deny the 
everyday responsibility of our words may also be to insulate us from 
something close to us, where we indulge instead a vicarious even prurient 
interest in experience more horrific and extreme. That surely would be 
something to regret. 
 I have come to these thoughts partly through reading Stanley Cavell’s 
remarkable “little book” The Senses of Walden (1992), which he wrote in a 
period of some six weeks in the summer of 1971, roughly in the middle of 
the sixteen years it took him to write The Claim of Reason (1979). In some 
ways that text, for anyone who knows Walden, may be a good entry into his 
work, for it seems to contain in microcosm so many of his broader 
philosophical themes. He wrote it at a time when the Vietnam War was 
nearing its dreadful denouement, and he wrote it in a sense of disgust and 
perhaps shame at his country’s interventions in East Asia. In its modest way 
it stands, like Walden and “Civil Disobedience”, as a voice of discontent 
about the world as it is and as an invocation of the world as it could or 
should be. 
 In this book, and in Cavell’s writings elsewhere, the question of the 
social contract is broached, with emphasis on the kind of paradox this 
contains. Society is based on a social contract, but that contract has not 
happened. Neither you nor I have consented – that is, there was never a 
time when we signed up to the contract on which our society is based. It 
was, in the myth, always there before us. But Cavell’s response is very far 
from a disavowal of responsibility, a claiming that one’s hands are clean. On 
the contrary, I give my consent in every moment, even, one might 
emphasise,in the words I habitually use. In a sense I am condemned to this, 
and the gestures of disobedience I may make, however exemplary and 
dangerous these may prove to be, will never fully exempt me from this 
responsibility. For there is no alternative – morally, politically, existentially – 
than to seek community with others, to test out in my words the world to 
which I can responsibly give my consent. 
 In the end then Thoreau’s importance is not to be understood as 
deriving from an overtly political gesture and a token night in jail. His 
deeper, more pervasive message has to do with our relation to our language 
and with a critical sharpening of our sense of ourselves as voiced, as 
necessarily sentenced, and as destined for conviction. 
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